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Bureaucratic Politics and the 
Foreign Policy Process: 
The Missing Element Of Process 
Paul D. Hoyt 
West Virginia University 
This article reviews the recent resurgence in interest in 
Bureaucratic Politics, especially with the publication of 
the second edition of Essence of Decision (Allison and 
Zelikow , 1999) . The paper presents a review of both Alli-
son and his critics and argues that both sides in the de-
bate have over-emphasized the issue of the structure of 
polic y making . A set of scope conditions for determining 
the applicability of the bureaucratic politics approach 
are presented and used to argue that the Cuban missile 
crisis was a poor choice of case for evaluating Allison's 
argument . The paper presents a discussion on the role of 
process in bureaucratic politics , arguing that process has 
been neglected. Some ideas on how to better incorporate 
process elements in the approach are considered . 
INTRODUCTION 
The release of the second edition of Essence of Decision (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) is likely to spur a renewed interest in the study of bureaucratic politics as an ex-
planatory framework for the foreign policy process .1 The new 
statement of the approach comes after several high profile cri-
tiques have appeared in such journals as the American Political 
Science Review, International Security, and World Politics (Ben-
'See also the symposia on "Governmental Politics" in Mershon International Studies 
Review. Vol. 42, Supp. 2, November 1998, ed. Eric Stem and Bertjan Verbeek. 
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dor and Hammond, 1992; Welch, 1992; Rhodes, 1994).2 In this 
environment it is appropriate to ask where bureaucratic politics 
stand as an explanation of foreign policy. 
It is commonly recognized among analysts of foreign 
policy that the interpersonal interactions and dynamics of the 
decision-making group are key to understanding the policy proc-
ess and the eventual policy output (Vertzberger, 1990; Hermann, 
1993). Paradoxically, despite the awareness of the prevalence of 
the small group in foreign policy decision-making, there are still 
very few conceptual frameworks in the foreign policy realm for 
describing the policy process in foreign policy. The most visible 
and elaborated framework remains that of bureaucratic politics 
as described in Graham Allison's classic text, Essence of Deci-
sion (1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999).3 
However, neither Allison nor other proponents and crit-
ics of bureaucratic politics have done an adequate job in expli-
cating what the process of foreign policy decision-making 
entails. Instead, the debate has tended to focus on what is the true 
structure of the decision making body. The emphasis on structure 
2The conceptual differences between the two editions are minimal regarding the presen-
tation of bureaucratic politics as an explanatory framework. The fundamental insights and 
components of the model are maintained with only slight alterations. Thus, the second 
edition can best be viewed as a update of the original, not a major revision of that vol-
ume. 
Based on his work as transcriber (with Ernest May) of The Kennedy Tapes: Inside 
the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (1997), the addition of Zelikow as co-
author added greatly to the case material on the Cuban missile crisis. The other major 
update concerns the review of the relevant material on such research areas as game the-
ory, institutionalism, and epistemic communities, and does much to bring the literature 
review up-to-date. 
3Of course, not all foreign policy decisions fall under under the rubric of bureaucratic 
politics. Other interpretations, such as groupthink (Janis, 1982), predominant leaders 
(Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, 1989), and various voting schemes (Hermann, 1993; 
Vertzberger, 1990), also need to be acknowledged. However, the prevalence of these 
alternatives has not been demonstrated and their impact on the literature has not matched 
that of bureaucratic politics. 
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has resulted in a long, and so far fruitless, debate that has m 
many ways paralyzed the analysis of bureaucratic politics. 
I argue that there is a need to move beyond the current 
impasse on bureaucratic politics. One requirement for moving on 
is a set of explicit scope conditions that identify under what 
structural circumstances the insights of bureaucratic politics are 
likely to pertain. The second requirement is a better awareness of 
the types of existing process-focused research that can be incor-
porated into the bureaucratic politics approach to shed additional 
light on the foreign policy decision-making process. 
GRAHAM ALLISON AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS 
A reconciliation of Allison and his critics may, in the 
end, be possible. Fundamental to the reconciliation is the need to 
understand the bureaucratic politics perspective not as a general 
theory of international relations or a comprehensive model of 
foreign policy, but instead as a depiction of the causes of intra-
group conflict and its possible resolution within the policy proc-
4 
ess. 
I argue three points in answer to the "Allison paradox": 
How can the bureaucratic politics approach be so influential yet 
so widely criticized? The first point is that both the proponents 
and opponents of Allison are, in a sense, right. Allison's Model 
III traces a perspective that is intuitively appealing and appears 
to portray the reality of political decision-making. Yet, many of 
the specific propositions derived from Model III, and their appli-
cation to the Cuban missile crisis, fail both logical and empirical 
evaluation. 
The second point is that the failings of Allison's under-
taking have too readily led to a rejection of the overall enterprise. 
7ne use of the term "conflict" should be viewed as synonymous with "disagreement" or 
"dissent." 
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Instead , a middle ground needs to be identified. Allison has 
claimed too much for Model III while the critics have been too 
sweeping in their condemnation. What is needed is a more spe-
cific outline of the bureaucratic politics approach that states the 
scope conditions under which the model may be expected to be 
of value . 
Third, both Allison 's followers and his detractors have 
neglected a central element of Allison 's work . Frequently the 
debate has centered on specific aspects of the model , such as the 
"real " role of the president and whether roles determine policy 
posit ions, preferences , and status . The more significant, though 
underemphasized, contribution of Allison is in identifying the 
value of analyzing the process of conflict resolution in a shared-
power, mixed-motive decision making group. While Allison and 
Zelikow do provide for one procedure , that of bargaining and the 
"pulling and hauling" of politics (1999, 302), "pulling and haul-
ing" by no means exhausts the range of possibilities. Identifyin g 
and examining the mechanisms of intra-group conflict resolution 
constitutes a fruitful direction for the further study of the foreign 
policy process . 
Refocusing the debate on Allison allows us to avoid 
over-emphasizing some of the more marginal aspects in his ap-
proach and, instead, to take from Essence of Decision some 
valuable insights with which to extend and re-invigorate bureau-
cratic politics as a field of research. 
THE D EBATE O VER THE STRUCTU RE OF 
THE PO LICY MAKING GR OUP IN ALLISON AND HIS C RITICS 
Since the initial publication of Essence of Decision, 
there has been a growth industry in arguing the merits and com-
pleteness of Allison 's work. Model III, the organizational (bu-
reaucratic) politics approach, has, by far, received the most 
attention . The central argument is as follows: "The name of the 
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game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among 
players positioned hierarchically within the government. Gov-
ernment behavior can thus be understood according to a third 
conceptual model, not as organization outputs but as results of 
bargaining games" (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 255). Several 
debates have subsequently arisen over the accuracy of this inter-
pretation . 
A recurrent debate focuses on the role of the president in 
decision-making. Model ill proponents maintain that power in 
such policymaking circles is diffuse with no one player (in this 
case, the president) possessing a monopoly on the authority to 
decide ( Allison, 1971; Destler, 1972; Allison and Zelikow, 
1999). Instead, the president is portrayed as a "president-in-
sneakers" (Neustadt , 1960) seeking to persuade and reconcile the 
various factions of opinion within the decision making group . 
Acting in this capacity, the president attempts to engineer an ac-
ceptable decision . 
Critics argue that the president is not "a first among 
equals" but is instead a "king" with the power-some would say 
the moral obligation (Krasner, 1971)-to make choices and 
structure the decision-making environment according to his own 
desires. In this way, power in the decision-making circles is not 
diffuse, but is concentrated at the highest level (Krasner, 1971; 
Art, 1973; Perlmutter, 1974; Bendor and Hammond, 1992). 
A second debate revolves around the degree of opinion 
consensus among the members of the decision making group. 
For Allison and his followers, dissent and disagreement among 
the various bureaucratic actors is virtually inescapable (Destler, 
1972; Allison, 1999). The existence of numerous decision mak-
ers, each uniquely influenced by various pressures (such as bu-
reaucratic role, constituencies, personality, and so forth) 
inevitably produces different viewpoints on an issue. Believing 
that their cause and interpretation is correct, members will seek 
to have their positions adopted as the final group output. 
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Critics of the bureaucratic politics perspective have ar-
gued that the members of the president's inner circle are not 
likely to be as contrary as Allison suggests, since their inclusion 
and continuation in office depends upon presidential sufferance. 
They have been brought into the government by the president 
who has selected them because of their common views. Pos-
sessing a similar mind-set, these individuals are not likely to ad-
vocate ideas contrary to those of the president (Art, 1973). If 
dissent were to arise, it is argued that it would quickly dissipate 
as the dissenter moves to avoid accusations of disloyalty. There-
fore, in the end consensus will be the order of the day (Krasner, 
1971; Perlmutter, 1974; Freedman, 1976; Bendor and Hammon d, 
1992).5 
The third debate involves the notion of role effects. Usu-
ally the debate centers on the accuracy of the view that ''whe re 
you stand depends upon where you sit." Sometimes referred to 
as "Mile's Law," the proposition holds that the issue position of 
bureaucratic actors is a function of their bureaucratic role. The 
congruence between roles and positons is put forth to account for 
the range of policy options preferred by the various actors. Since 
each of the actors holds a unique bureaucratic role, with various 
attendant pressures and interests, each actor comes to perceiv e 
the issue in different ways and to advocate different solutions 
accordingly (Destler, 1972; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). 
1Several related points should be considered here: 
l. lntragroup conflict could be over goals, means, timing, or implementation. Thus, 
there are many opportunities for conflict to arise other than just over the policy goal. 
2. Allison applies his model to a presidential system where power is not likely to be 
so equally shared (still, there could be competition between advisors over access to the 
ear of the president). Application in other areans may require that we adjust our applica-
tions of bureaucratic politics to focus more on political situations where power is more 
evenly shared (cabinet systems and oligarchies for example). Doing so is likely to be 
more fruitful and it has the added benefit of extending the utility of bureaucratic politics 
by making it less of an Ameri-<:entric perspective. 
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This "bureaucratic determinism" (Cottam, 1977) has 
been attacked repeatedly as both simplistic and inaccurate (Kras-
ner, 1971). For example, the inherent preferences of some roles, 
such as the vice-president, are argued to be unlmown . More to 
the point , efforts to rigorously study the connection between bu-
reaucratic role and policy position have failed to find any tie 
(Smith , 1984-1985; Vertzberger, 1990; Rhodes, 1994). 
Of course , few analysts ever argued for such a rigid ap-
plication of this rule. Allison himself acknowledges in Essence 
of Decision that an actor's position on an issue is influenced by 
many things such as national security interests , organizational 
interests, domestic political interests, and personal interests 
(1999, 298). In doing so, Allison opens himself up to the subse-
quent criticism that, by allowing for so many influences, it is 
impossible to accurately predict when, and to what extent, or-
ganizational interests will determine the actor's position (Art, 
1973; Welch, 1992) .6 
In the end , there may be less to these debates than meets 
the eye. I argue that the bureaucratic politics perspective may 
prove useful as an analytic device only when three scope condi-
tions are evident. They are 
(1) Decision making must take place in a group set-
ting. 
(2) No one actor within the group may be predomi-
nant such that his/her opinion is sufficient to decide 
the issue. 
(3) The decision must be a case of split opinion (as to 
goals, means , timing, etc.) among the central political 
actors. 
61n the 1999 edition, Allison and Zelikow are careful to reject the "detem,inistic" version 
of this proposition though he does feel that a person's stance is still "strongly influenced" 
by their position (I 999, 307). 
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These scope conditions indicate the requisite structural 
characteristics of the policymaking group for the applicability of 
the bureaucratic polities framework. When all three circum-
stances are not met by the case at hand, then bureaucratic politics 
has little to say about the policy process and alternative depic-
tions need to be considered . 
Limiting the applicability of bureaucratic politics 
through these scope conditions leads to two conclusions. First, 
the Cuban missile crisis was, ironically, a poor choice for the 
study of bureaucratic politics. A close reading of Allison's own 
presentation of the case suggests that scope conditions 1 and 2 
were not sufficiently met for the insights of the bureaucratic 
politics approach to be useful (Krasner 1971; Bendor and 
Hammond 1992; Welch 1992). 
Scope condition 2 requires that no single actor be in a 
position to decide the issue at hand. Much emphasis has been 
made of the group decision-making aspect of the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Com) during the 
missile crisis . Yet, as Allison unwittingly demonstrates in his 
case study of the blockade decision, John F. Kennedy was the 
final, and unchallengeable , decision maker. The ExCom had no 
decision-making role and was, at best, an advisory body. 
As Allison (1971; 1999) describes the events of the cri-
sis, four main options were identified for dealing with the Soviet 
placement of missiles in Cuba: do nothing, undertake a diplo-
matic approach to the Soviets, initiate a blockade (quarantine) of 
Cuba, or launch an air strike against the Soviet installations. De-
spite some early support within the ExCom, the first two options 
were never given serious consideration because "The President 
had rejected this course from the outset" (Sorensen, 1965, as 
quoted in Allison, 1971, 202; italics added). The fourth option, 
the air strike, was initially favored by a number of members of 
the ExCom including Kennedy himself. What moved Kennedy 
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off this position to instead favor the blockade was not bargaining 
or pulling and hauling within the ExCom but instead the infor-
mation that an air strike could not be surgical. According to Alli-
son, with this information the air strike became a "null option" 
(1971, 205). Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a propo-
nent of the air strike option, met with Kennedy on Thursday 
(October 18) and tried to convince Kennedy to support the air 
strike: "The President listened to his argument , but Acheson left 
with no question in his mind about where the buck stopped" 
(Allison, 1971, 207). 
Kennedy did not attend the next two ExCom meetings . 
When he did attend an ExCom meeting on Thursday evening, he 
"had already moved from the air-strike to the blockade camp" 
(Sorensen, 1965 as quoted in Allison, 1971, 205). As Allison 
puts it, "That evening, Kennedy informed the entire group of his 
decision in favor of the blockade" (Allison , 1971, p.207; italics 
added). 
The final decision was made on Saturday, October 20, in 
a meeting of the National Security Council. The remaining ele-
ment in the decision was whether the blockade should be paired 
with an offer to negotiate on U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy, 
plus the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba or with an ultimatum 
demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles or face air 
strikes (two other options-an air strike without the blockade 
and a blockade with no other action-were also presented) (Alli-
son and Zelikow, 1999, 344). After hearing the various presenta-
tions, "President Kennedy first sharply ruled out the blockade-
negotiate variant. .. He then ruled in favor of the blockade-
ultimatum option .. . " (Allison, 1999, 344-345, italics added). 
In brief, Kennedy was not beholding to the opinions or 
votes of the members of the ExCom. In the end, President Ken-
nedy, on his own, eliminated three of the four initial options from 
consideration and then decided on the form of the blockade . In 
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doing so, Kennedy was acting as a predominant leader in the 
policy process . Unfortunately for Allison's case, burea ucratic 
politics , with its emphasis on intra-group bargaining (the "pull-
ing" and "hauling" of politics Allison identified) did not make 
this decision-Kennedy did . 
As for Scope condition 1 that the decision be made in a 
group setting, the ExCom was such a setting and it was charac-
terized by differences of opinion among the participants (Scope 
condition 3). However , as previously discussed , the princi pal 
actor was John F. Kennedy . Thus, the critical question is where 
was he during the decision making process . In fact , Kenne dy 
appears to have had little direct involvement in the ExCom de-
liberations . The crisis broke on Tuesday morning (October 16). 
On Wednesday the 17th, during the height of the ExCom debate, 
Kennedy was absent , having flown to Connecticut for a cam-
paign commitment. That evening he did meet with Robert Ken-
nedy and Sorensen , but not the full ExCom . On Thurs day 
(October 18), Kennedy did not attend any ExCom meetings until 
the evening session where he announced his decision (Allison, 
1971, 203-205). 
Thus , the critical decision of implementing a blockade of 
Cuba was not made in a group setting and was not made by a 
group of actors sharing power. It was made by Kennedy, aware 
of the ExCom , but not controlled by it.7 
The second conclusion is that when appropriate cases of 
bureaucratic politics are found, the crucial concern should not be 
over whether the role determines a player 's position , preferen ce, 
or power. Instead, the focus should be on the collective decision 
7The failure of the Cuban missile cris is, as a single case , to satisfy all three conditio ns 
doe s not mean that the bureaucrat ic polit ics perspec tive itself should be abandoned . The 
research challenge is to find cases where these three conditions do apply and then exam-
ine the ut ility of the bure aucrat ic pol itics approach . 
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making process under such conditions and how the divergent 
positions are reconciled such that a policy output emerges. 
In brief , these three scope conditions specify, and limit, 
the "structure" within which bureaucratic politics is operational. 
Doing so serves to resolve some of the issues that have long di-
vided Allison and his critics. One position is not right and the 
other wrong, they simply are talking about different structural 
conditions. 
Within a better-specified structure , however, the more 
critical, and under appreciated, task is to grasp the "process " 
through which the different actor 's positions are reconciled in 
order to make group action possible (Rosati, 1981). 
PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS 
TO RESOLVE INTRA-GROUP CONFLICT 
The argument so far has illustrated the extent of prior ef-
forts to define the "structure" of bureaucratic politics. If we ac-
cept that bureaucratic politics will have variable utility based 
upon whether the scope conditions are satisfied, we can move 
beyond those debates and concentrate on other aspects of the 
perspective. 
A critical element in Allison is the need for some process 
for intragroup conflict resolution. Of course , there is no certainty 
that any particular group will be characterized by factionalism or 
dissensus. In that case, a different set of group dynamics may 
apply and effect the final decision . However, there are likely to 
be a set of cases where no quick consensus emerges among the 
group members . In fact, foreign policy issues , which are com-
monly ambiguous and complex in nature , are particularly sus-
ceptible to alternative interpretations and hence, policy 
preferences (Vertzberger, 1990; Hermann, 1993). The bureau-
cratic politics approach is most usefully applied under such cir-
cumstances. 
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If this situation, as defined in the scope conditions previ-
ously described, pertains, then the insights of bureaucratic poli-
tics become relevant. Allison and Zelikow state that the critical 
question is "How are players' stands, influence, and moves com-
bined to yield governmental decisions and actions?" (1999, 300). 
The actual process of opinion resolution is achieved, say Allison 
and Zelikow, through bargaining whereby "each player pulls and 
hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will ad-
vance his conception of national, organizational, group, and per-
sonal interests" (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 302; see also 
Neustadt, 1960; Destler, 1972). Through the bargaining process 
the divergent positions reach a policy "resultant" that satisfies 
the actors to some degree, although the final output may not be 
any one actor's favored position or even a policy foreseen by any 
member. 
Unfortunately, Allison and Zelikow provide very little 
insight into the actual process that takes place. What does "bar-
gaining," "pulling" and "hauling" entail? What behaviors con-
stitute this process? They acknowledge that "accurate accounts 
of the bargaining that yielded a resolution of the issue" are quite 
rare ( 1999, 312), and, they say, that developing a method of reli-
able process reconstruction constitutes "this model's most 
pressing need" (1971, 181). 
A close examination of Allison's presentation of the case 
reveals very little in terms of the actual decision making process. 
At most, Allison provides evidence of the various positions pre-
sented within the ExCom. What is lacking is a detailed discus-
sion of the various forms of bargaining or pulling and hauling 
that are the central dynamic element in the model. The actual 
policymaking process within the ExCom or between the ExCom 
and the President receives scant attention. 
As evidence of the workings of the policy process, 
glancing references to "bargaining" and "pulling and hauling" 
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will not suffice. More concrete and systematic descriptions of the 
actions and interactions of the actors are required. Similarly, 
most critiques-focused on other issues-have also not provided 
much in the way of elaboration or alternatives. The absence of 
elaboration has resulted in a certain gap in the discussion. Char-
acterizing the process as one simply of "bargaining" overlooks 
much of the diversity and nuance of decision-making. The diver-
sity has great implications for the policy output chosen and de-
serves attention. 
In the next section I briefly review a number of areas of 
research that provide some insight into the fuller activities of the 
policy process. Subsequent research into the foreign policy proc-
ess may be well served by incorporating these, plus, undoubtedly 
other, elements into the analysis. 
There have been efforts (particularly in public admini-
stration, social psychology, and political science) to identify the 
various processes of intragroup conflict resolution. In such "po-
litical-bureaucratic" situations, where opinions are divided and 
power is shared among the group members acting as advocates 
(Meltsner, 1990; Rosenthal et al., 1991; Bryson and Crosby, 
1992), a number of potential actions may take place. 
Though not developed by Allison, the closest set of pro-
cess concepts to Allison's "bargaining" is that of compromise 
among the group members. Vertzberger (1990) describes three 
types of compromise: 
(1) Content compromise involves the adoption 
of a third alternative as a substitute for the con-
flicting positions. This new position may "split 
the difference" of the original positions or it may 
constitute an entirely new approach. 
(2) Temporal compromise is when one member 
yields on one issue with the understanding that 
the other member will similarly yield on a future 
issue. This form of "log-rolling" requires an ex-
VOL. 28 2000 
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pectation that the member's interaction is reit-
erative. 
(3) Interissue compromise occurs when the dis-
agreement involves multiple issues simultane-
ously. A group member may compromise on 
those issues for which the salience level is low 
in exchange for compliance by the other group 
member(s) on the issue(s) of higher salience. 
Such "vote-trading" does not require a reitera-
tive aspect. 
Another response, commonly portrayed as the antithesis 
of bureaucratic politics, is consensus seeking among the group 
membership. Under this generic argument, positional differences 
either do not emerge or are quickly stifled, allowing the group to 
arrive at a common decision in the virtual absence of conflict. As 
noted earlier, several of Allison's critics argue that decisional 
conflict will not occur because the group members are all ap-
pointed by the president and thus will work to maintain group 
harmony out of shared beliefs, loyalty, and/or fear (what Raven, 
1990, calls "coercive power"). 
Other dynamics that may lead to a quick consensus in-
clude the rapid emergence of an "operative consensus" where, 
despite underlying differences in reasoning, a single operational 
policy is favored by the group members (Vertzberger, 1990); an 
acceptance of the views held by a large majority or the higher 
status members of the group (Vertzbergcr, 1990); or the func-
tioning of a certain personality type that favors conformity even 
at the expense of personal judgment (Asch, 1951). A more ex-
treme, and pathological, version of this pattern of consensus 
achievement is well-described in the "groupthink" literature 
which argues that group members may engage in conformity and 
consensus seeking to such an extent that careful analysis and 
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vigilant decision making do not occur (Janis, 1982; Hermann , 
1993). 
When differences among the group members are persis-
tent, other forms of resolution may be used. Group members may 
engage in persuasive argumentation (informational power) in an 
effort to convince others to adopt a different perspective (Maoz, 
1990; Raven, 1990). In this version , the logical power of the po-
sition provides the means of gaining the acceptance of other 
group members until one position emerges as the consensus 
choice. 
Other forms of social power may also be used to influ-
ence other members. Raven (1990) refers to such influences as 
"referent power" ( calling on feelings of similarity among the 
members); "legitimate power " (calling on the structural relation 
betwe en the actors) and "reward power " (promises of benefits 
from compl iance) through which group members seek to gain 
the adherence of one another to a preferred policy position . 
While there is no certainty that the "best" policy will be adopted 
using such mechanisms , consensus is sought and may be 
achieved. 
Of course , there is no requ irement that a group arrive at 
a consensus position in order for there to be a decisional output. 
Oftentimes , disagreements will persist even after prolonged dis-
cussion. To break such deadlocks a voting process may be used 
(Vertzberger , 1990; Hermann , 1993). Relying on voting schemes 
allows making decisions and taking actions even in the absence 
of group consensus . The particulars of the voting arrangement 
can play a large role in determining the outcome (Maoz, 1990). 
All of these processes share one common element: 
resolution is achieved through some interactive mechanism 
within the small group . Analysis of the policy making process 
also needs to recognize that resolution may also be sought 
through the less overt mechanism of political manipulation. Ma-
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nipulation involves a different response to the problem of decid-
ing policy in opinion divided decision-making groups.8 
By manipulating a group's composition, information 
flows, and/or processes, actors may be able to push the decision 
in a favored direction. Manipulation is argued to take three pos-
sible forms: informational, procedural , and compositional. In-
formational manipulation occurs when a group member ( or 
members) attempts to alter the preferences of another member(s) 
by selectively presenting , withholding, or interpreting informa-
tion to the group (Maoz, 1990; Meltsner, 1990). Such control of 
information allows the manipulator to appear more knowledge-
able about the issue than the other group members , and thus 
make use of "expert power" (Raven 1990). Manipulators of in-
formation may also ignore discrepant information, "bury" or 
"highlight " certain information, or "frame" the issue in self-
serving ways (Vertzberger, 1990). 
Procedural manipulation involves an attempt by a group 
member to use the existing practices and processes of the group 
to further his/her policy preference . Practices such as agenda-
setting, strategic voting, determining the operative decision rule, 
and the "salami tactic" are all procedural manipulations designed 
to structure the decision environment to advance the manipula-
tor 's position (Riker, 1986; Lynn, 1987; Maoz , 1990; Bryson and 
Crosby, 1992). 
Compositional manipulation entails manipulating the 
membership of the group such that supporters of the manipula-
tor 's position are included and accorded high status while dis-
senters are either diminished in status or even removed entirely 
from the decision-making group. A primary benefit of manipula-
'The determina tion of success is a difficult issue . For this paper , success is considered an 
increase in the influence a manipulator has over the policy decision . Therefore , success 
should not necessaril y be equated with a "high quality" decision or with group satisfac-
tion. 
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tion techniques is that they operate outside the social realm and 
thus may achieve success without entailing the difficult process 
of getting others to consciously alter their preferences (Riker, 
1986; Maez 1990). 
The potential for manipulation , voting practices, power 
plays, and/or consensus seeking within a decision making group 
demonstrates the existence of alternative process behaviors to the 
limited bargaining notion put forth by Allison. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Research into the process of foreign policy creation has 
Jagged behind that in the domestic arena. A portion of the expla-
nation for the lag lies in the manner in which the most visible 
foreign policymaking perspective, bureaucratic politics, has been 
treated. The literature on bureaucratic polities has focused on 
what appear to be sharp divisions between its proponents and 
opponents on several critical dimensions: What is the actual role 
of the president in the decision making process? And to what 
degree can the decision-making environment be characterized as 
heterogeneous regarding the policy preferences of the central 
players? Much attention has also been given to the notion that 
bureaucratic role determines a player's position on the issue. 
Absolutist positions on these debates are neither empiri-
cally justifiable nor theoretically helpful. A more valuable en-
deavor is to assess the scope conditions under which the 
bureaucratic politics approach to the foreign policy process is 
most applicable. Previous debates over Model III in Essence of 
Decision may thus be better viewed as more a matter of the de-
gree to which the Cuban missile crisis actually meets the scope 
conditions of the bureaucratic politics approach than a debate 
over the utility of the approach itself. 
It has been argued here that the focus of the debate has 
centered largely on the structure of the decision-making envi-
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ronment. What need to receive more explicit attention are the 
processes of reconciling the divergent views among the actors 
within a shared-power setting. 
Further research on the process of intragroup conflict 
resolution will serve to better inform the bureaucratic politics 
approach and enhance its utility as a tool for the study of the for-
eign policy decision-making process. Emphasizing questions of 
structure over process has led to too ready a dismissal of the bu-
reaucratic politics approach, which , if properly amended, still 
offers powerful analytic value and inspiration for a new genera-
tion of process-oriented research. 
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